The New Transfer Pricing Tax Regulations: Now That They\u27re Here What Should You Do by Davis, Roland
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 6
January 1994
The New Transfer Pricing Tax Regulations: Now
That They're Here What Should You Do
Roland Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Roland Davis, The New Transfer Pricing Tax Regulations: Now That They're Here What Should You Do, 10 Santa Clara High Tech.
L.J. 195 (2012).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol10/iss1/6
THE NEW TRANSFER PRICING TAX REGULATIONS:




I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 196
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION .......................... 196
Ill. PENALTY PROVISIONS ................................. 197
IV. ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS ..................... 199
V. THE PROPOSED § 482 REGULATIONS ................... 202
A. Matching Transaction Method .................... 203
B. Comparable Adjustable Transaction Method ....... 203
C. Comparable Profit Method ........................ 204
D. Comparable Profit Interval Method ............... 204
E. Qualified Cost Sharing Arrangements .............. 206
VI. THE TEMPORARY § 482 REGULATIONS ................. 208
A. Important Changes From The 1992 Proposed
Regulations to the 1993 Temporary Regulations ... 208
B. "Best Method" Rule .............................. 209
C. Comparability .................................... 210
D. "Arm's Length" Standard ........................ 211
E. Pricing Methods for Transfers of Property ......... 212
1. Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method.. 212
2. Comparable Profits Method ................... 213
VII. NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS ......................... 213
A. Profit Split Method ............................... 213
B. Foreign Legal Restrictions ........................ 214
VIII. IRS IMPROVEMENTS IN ADMINISTERING § 482 IssUs ... 214
IX. COMPETENT AUTHORITY .............................. 215
X. CONCLUSION ......................................... 215
APPENDIX: LITIGATION OF § 482 ISSUES ...................... 217
1. Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner ................ 217
2. Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner ........... 218
3. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner ................. 219
Copyright © 1994 Roland Ryan Davis
t B.S., Santa Clara University; J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 1994. For
the past five years, Mr. Davis has worked in international tax with a Big Six accounting finn.
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
4. Bausch & Lomb v. Commissioner .............. 219
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 1993, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) re-
leased a set of temporary regulations (1993 Temporary Regulations)
on the issue of intercompany transfer pricing of tangible and intangi-
ble property.' The transfer pricing rules apply to multinational com-
panies and the way intercompany prices are established.2 The rules
are intended to ensure that the price being charged between related
parties is the same as it would be if the transaction were between unre-
lated parties.3 The IRS will impose severe penalties for failure to
comply with these regulations.'
Transfer pricing considerations are an important issue in the high
technology area. Rapid advances in technology result in continuing
changes in pricing strategy by corporations in order to compete effec-
tively in the marketplace. Any tendency to ignore the tax implications
of transfer pricing can be serious, particularly given the volume and
high dollar value of high technology property that is transferred.
This comment will cover the penalty provisions of the 1993 Tem-
porary Regulations, a discussion of advanced pricing agreements, im-
portant changes from the 1992 proposed regulations (1992 Proposed
Regulations) in the 1993 Temporary Regulations (including a review
of the 1992 Proposed and 1993 Temporary Regulations), along with
suggestions on how to implement these new regulations and avoid
substantial IRS penalties. The appendix discusses a few select transfer
pricing cases.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
From a business standpoint, an important issue that needs to be
addressed is the tax consequences that arise from the intercompany
transfer of property. Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter I.R.C.)
§ 4825 deals with the intercompany transfer price attributable to both
1. 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (1993) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 482).
2. For example, these regulations cover the price that is charged between a parent com-
pany and its subsidiary for the transfer of intangible (patents, copyrights, etc.) or tangible (disk
drives, monitors, etc.) goods.
3. It has been suggested that significant tax dollars can be generated through the enforce-
ment of transfer pricing regulations by focusing on foreign-owned multinational corporations as
well as the U.S.-owned multinationals which have operations in low tax countries. Kathleen
Matthews & Julianne MacKinnon, Practical Effects Of New Transfer Pricing Rules Dominate
NYC Conference, 93 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) at 69-6 (Apr. 12, 1993).
4. I.R.C. § 6662.
5. I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
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intangible and tangible goods.6 Recent legislation and case law in this
area indicate an increased scrutiny by the IRS with regard to the pric-
ing methodology applied to intercompany transfers of property.
The Tax Reform Act of 19861 revised I.R.C. § 482 to require that
the consideration for the intercompany transfer of intangible property
be based on a "commensurate with income" standard. This was fol-
lowed in October 1988 by the issuance of a transfer pricing study,
known as the "White Paper."' Taxpayer comments on the White Pa-
per were used to formulate proposed regulations.
The 1992 Proposed Regulations to I.R.C. § 482 were issued by
the IRS on January 30, 1992.9 These regulations are the culmination
of the IRS's continued effort to ensure that corporations are charging a
fair amount for the transfer of goods (tangible or intangible) between
"related parties." 10
The 1992 Proposed Regulations were retitled and released as the
1993 Temporary Regulations on January 21, 1993.11 Many organiza-
tions submitted comments and suggestions for revisions to the 1992
Proposed Regulations, which were considered by the IRS in preparing
the 1993 Temporary Regulations.' 2
III. PENALTY PROVISIONS
A significant series of proposed regulations covering the penalty
provisions of I.R.C. § 6662(e) and I.R.C. § 6662(h) were issued along
6. [Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers]: In any case of two
or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether
or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible prop-
erty (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such
transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible.
Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986).
8. I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
9. 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992).
10. Related parties are companies that are members of the same controlled group (those
that are controlled by the same interests). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1A(a)(5)
11. 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (1993)
12. Id. at 5265
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with the I.R.C. § 482 regulations. 13 These regulations present a criti-
cal reason why taxpayers should be concerned with intercompany
transfer pricing.
The potential severity of the penalties is alarming. If the IRS
makes transfer pricing adjustments of more than $5 million or 10% of
the taxpayer's gross receipts, a 20% penalty will be imposed. 4 If the
adjustments are more than $20 million or 20% of gross receipts, a
40% penalty will be imposed. 15 However, these penalties will not be
applied if the taxpayer can show that the transfer pricing method used
is one indicated in the § 482 regulations, is reasonable, and is sup-
ported by "contemporaneous documentation."16
The phrase "contemporaneous documentation" means that the
documentation the taxpayer uses to support the intercompany transfer
price must be provided to the IRS within 30 days of an IRS request
and must have been prepared prior to or at the time the tax return was
prepared. 17
This contemporaneous documentation requirement is indicative
of the prospective approach that needs to be undertaken in this area.
Moreover, since high technology companies are in a rapidly develop-
ing industry, this contemporaneous approach to transfer pricing is a
requirement that should not be overlooked. This may prove to be par-
ticularly cumbersome since new technology products are frequently
released and the intercompany prices that are charged for them will
therefore vary just as often. As a result, there may not be adequate
documentation prepared to substantiate the transfer price charged.
To avoid a penalty in cases where the taxpayer does not use an
indicated pricing method, the taxpayer must show that none of the
methods in I.R.C. § 482 would clearly reflect income and that the
method the taxpayer chooses does clearly reflect income.' 8 In addi-
tion, the taxpayer must still show reasonableness and contemporane-
ous documentation. 19
13. These penalty regulations were revised with the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 [hereinafter OBRA 1993], and apply to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1993. This article reflects those changes.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(a) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)).
15. Id.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-50) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)), and I.R.C.
§ 6662(e)(3)(B)(i) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-5(j)(ii) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)).
18. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(ii)(1) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)).
19. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(ii)(l) (as amended by OBRA 1993 § 13236(b)). According to
Robert E. Culbertson, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (International), the penalty regulations are
categorized by specified methods and unspecified methods. "If you have a specified method, all
you have to do is show that you are reasonably applying it. If you have an unspecified method,
[Vol. 10
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Another way a taxpayer can meet these criteria is with an ad-
vanced pricing agreement, which is discussed below.
Given the substantial penalties the IRS can assess for transfer
pricing adjustments, it is important that taxpayers be aware of the cor-
rect methodologies to determine a transfer price the IRS will accept in
this area. Taxpayers should therefore implement them as soon as pos-
sible. This issue cannot wait to be resolved at the time of an IRS
audit, particularly since the documentation that is required must be
prepared at the time the tax return is prepared.
One method of determining an adequate transfer price is to com-
mission a transfer pricing study. This service is provided by account-
ing firms, economists and other consulting organizations. The benefit
to engaging such a study is that it provides an objective opinion as to a
reasonable transfer price. However, the cost of the study must be bal-
anced with the benefit derived.
IV. ADVANCED PRICING AGREEMENTS
In conjunction with the penalty provisions in the 1993 Temporary
Regulations, taxpayers should be aware of the advantages and disad-
vantages of an advanced pricing agreement (APA).20 These agree-
ments allow taxpayers to obtain IRS approval of their transfer pricing
methodology prior to an audit. Although this practice protects the tax-
payer from exposure on an audit and the subsequent penalties that can
arise, many companies may be hesitant to release the requisite detailed
financial information. By entering into an APA, the taxpayer will be
revealing information that will assist the IRS in understanding the in-
tercompany pricing arrangement, but it could also alert the IRS to in-
consistencies that may never have surfaced in the course of the regular
audit process. However, this should be balanced against the risks that
come from potential penalty assessments for those who choose to wait
until they are audited.
On March 1, 1991, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 91-22
which set out the method by which an advanced pricing agreement
(APA) can be submitted to the IRS. 2 An APA is an agreement be-
however, you have to show that the method clearly reflects income and show that no specified
method clearly reflects income." Harriet Hanlon, IRS Official Offers Transfer Pricing Insights,
93 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) at 168-4 (Aug. 31, 1993).
20. According to Harry L. Gutman, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
"the goal of the section 482 provisions... is to encourage... (APAs), not to penalize taxpayers
or force them to follow a formula." Becky Nagle, Foreign Tax Bill's 482 Provisions Are to
Promote APAs, Not to Punish, JCT Chief Says, 92 Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts) at 229-1
(Nov. 16, 1992).
21. Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526.
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tween the IRS and the taxpayer that covers the transfer price between
two or more organizations, trades, or businesses that are directly or
indirectly controlled by the same interests.22 Moreover, the agreement
can also include a foreign competent authority as well as the IRS.23
The approach to which the taxpayer must adhere is determined
under the I.R.C. § 482 regulations.24 The proposed methodology
"must be consistent with the arm's length standard" and "should pro-
duce, with as little adjustment as possible, an anticipated range of
arm's length results that clearly reflect income." Absent any revi-
sions in the prefiling conference, the following items must be submit-
ted as part of the APA request:26
(1) The organizations, trades, businesses, and transactions
that will be subject to the APA;
(2) The names, addresses, telephone numbers, and taxpayer
identification numbers of the controlled taxpayers that
are parties to the requested APA (the parties);
(3) A properly completed Form 2848 for any persons author-
ized to represent the parties in connection with the
request;
(4) A brief description of the general history of business op-
erations, worldwide organizational structure, ownership,
capitalization, financial arrangements, principal busi-
nesses, and the place or places where such businesses are
conducted, and major transaction flows for the parties;
(5) Representative financial and tax data of the parties for
the last three years, together with other relevant data and
documents in support of the proposed TPM [transfer
pricing methodology] ... ;
(6) The functional currency of each party...,
(7) The taxable year of each party;
(8) A description of significant financial accounting methods
(9) An explanation of significant financial and tax account-
ing differences ...
22. Rev. Proc. 91-22 § 1.
23. This applies to international transfer pricing issues, for example, a transfer of technol-
ogy from a U.S. parent company to a foreign subsidiary. The competent authority issues are
discussed in part V.
24. Rev. Proc. 91-22 § 3.01.
25. d § 3.02. Taxpayers can also engage in prefiling conferences to clarify what data is
required by the IRS. Id § 4.
26. Each request and renewal costs $5,000. Id. § 5.14.
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(10) A discussion of any relevant statutory provisions, tax
treaties, court decisions, regulations, revenue rulings, or
revenue procedures that relate to the TPM; and
(11) An explanation of the taxpayer's and the government's
positions on previous and current issues at the examina-
tion, appeals, judicial, or competent authority levels (and
any resolutions) that relate to the TPM.27
An APA request should also include the proposed term for the
APA and any requests for competent authority considerations. The
IRS may also require an independent expert opinion.2"
Clearly the volume of information requested as a result of an
APA will make many taxpayers hesitate. However, large multina-
tional corporations may be able to benefit from an APA, particularly
considering the dollar value of the transactions at stake.
Several companies have already begun the APA process, 9 in-
cluding Apple Computer,30 General Motors, Barclays Bank PLC,
Sumitomo Bank Capital Markets, Inc., and Matsushita, the Japanese
conglomerate.31 An example of the potential penalty assessments is
the Matsushita case, in which the IRS assessed approximately $3 mil-
lion in taxes for overcharging on video-cassette recorders from 1981-
1982. Although the case has since been settled, the IRS is still audit-
ing the firm's U.S. subsidiary for later years.32
27. Id. § 5.03.
28. Id. § 8.01.
29. As of March 1993, there were approximately 45 taxpayers involved in the APA pro-
cess and 36 taxpayers were "considering" entering the process. GULC/NFTC Conference Paper
On APAs By IRS Director Of APA Program, Robert Ackerman, 93 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Ana-
lysts) at 51-11 (Mar. 17, 1993).
30. Apple's request filled three loose leaf binders. Mary Louise Dionne & Mike Urse, IRS
Issues Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) Guidance, Tech. Tax Spotlight Libr. (Int'l Tax Serv.)
at 91-7 (Apr. 15, 1991). Apple also has voluntarily entered into a binding arbitration case with
the IRS over transfer pricing issues between Apple Computer, Inc. and its subsidiary Apple
Singapore with regard to the income earned in Singapore for Apple's printed circuit board and
system manufacturing. Although a decision was reached on September 3, 1993, the details were
not made public. Arbitration Panel Reaches Decision On Apple Computer Section 482 Adjust-
ment, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-4 (Sept. 10, 1993).
31. Announced November 10, 1992 (Matsushita Electric Announces APA With IRS, NTAA
On Transfer Pricing, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-5 (Nov. 12, 1992)); A company spokesman
stated that "In light of the complex nature of [cross-border, bilateral] taxation and enormous
work and legal costs involved, we concluded that it is better to use the advanced pricing agree-
ment." Id. As an example of the effect that these I.R.C. § 482 regulations are having on Japa-
nese companies, a December 1991 survey by the Federation of Economic Organizations of
Japan, which is Japan's largest economic lobby, revealed that out of 328 companies, 107 stated
that they were anticipating having disputes with the IRS. Furthermore, 47 firms stated that within
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Despite the assurance of submitting an APA, there is still the
problem that many companies either do not have the information re-
quested readily available, or more importantly, do not want the IRS to
have access to audit information prior to an actual audit. These con-
cerns must be balanced against the benefit of avoiding the penalty and
interest assessments that could result from an audit.
Another concern of taxpayers contemplating an APA is the time
it takes to get an APA approved. The IRS estimates that the APA
process takes an average of nine to twelve months for each case. 3
Although this may seem to be a long period of time, it is substantially
shorter than the 15-24 month period it takes to perform an audit and
the additional time spent on appeal. Costs to the taxpayer should also
not be much more than what would be incurred on an audit, although
initial costs would be higher.34 It is also important to keep in mind
that the APA process should be carefully considered in the high tech-
nology area due to the rate at which products become obsolete.
The release of the 1993 Temporary Regulations does not affect
Revenue Procedure 91-22. Therefore, advanced pricing agreements
continue to be an important avenue for taxpayers to consider when
addressing intercompany transfer pricing issues.
V. THE PROPOSED § 482 REGULATIONS
The following section examines the proposed regulations that
were released on January 30, 1992. Although the temporary regula-
tions have been released, an understanding of the proposed regulations
is necessary since some of the concepts mentioned have been retained
in the new regulations.
The most significant change in the 1992 Proposed Regulations
over previous law is that the original 1968 regulations regarding trans-
fers of intangibles were replaced.35 The standard to be applied with
respect to intangibles is the "arm's length standard," which states that
the "consideration for the intangible shall be commensurate with the
33. IRS Said Trying To Improve Competent Authority Process, Expand APA Program,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-4 (Nov. 13, 1992), comments of Regina Deanehan, IRS assistant
commissioner (international) at the Tax Executives Institute annual conference, November 10,
1992.
34. Id.
35. [Intangible:] (1) Patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns, or
knowhow; (2) Copyrights; (3) Literary, musical, or artistic compositions; (4)
Trademarks, trade names, or brand names; (5) Franchises, licenses, or contracts;
(6) Methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies, fore-
casts, estimates, customer lists, or technical data; (7) Other similar items; and (8)
Any interests in such items.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(1)(ii), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992).
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income attributable to the intangible."36 This "commensurate with in-
come" standard is an important concept that is carried throughout the
transfer pricing regulations.
The intangible transfer must also be in an appropriate form. The
1992 Proposed Regulations states that "if the transferee pays nominal
or no consideration for an intangible... the arm's length considera-
tion shall be in the form of a royalty unless a different form is clearly
more appropriate."37
There are three prescribed methods in the 1992 Proposed Regula-
tions for determining the arm's length price: the matching transaction
method (MTM), the comparable adjustable transaction method (CAT),
and the comparable profit method (CPM). 38 This is also the strict or-
der of priority that is given to each method. The taxpayer must first
try to apply the MTM, then the CAT, and finally the CPM. The tax-
payer is not required to demonstrate that the higher priority method or
methods do not apply, but the highest priority method appropriate to
the transaction must be applied.39
A. Matching Transaction Method
A matching transaction is one that is the "same or substantially
similar" in both economic conditions and contractual terms as the in-
tangible being transferred.4 0 In other words, the uncontrolled transfer
must be an identical match to the intangible transaction to which it is
being compared. Given the significant and particular requirements
that need to be met for a transaction under this method, it is unlikely
that many taxpayers will be able to use the MTM. This is particularly
true since intangibles tend to be unique, as are the contractual terms by
which they are transferred.
B. Comparable Adjustable Transaction Method
The CAT is used when the MTM does not apply. This method is
applied when the intangible property transferred is the same as or sim-
ilar to the intangible with which it is being compared. Under this
method, the economic conditions and contractual terms are considered
adjustable only if they are "sufficiently similar [so] that the effect...
can be determined with reasonable accuracy."41 However, if the prof-
36. d § 1.482-2(d)(1)(i).
37. Id § 1.482-2(d)(2)(ii).
38. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(1)(iii).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(3)(i).
41. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(ii).
1994]
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its of the taxpayer are not within the comparable profit interval (CPI)
then the transaction will not be considered to be at arm's length. The
CPI, discussed below, is the range of profits that uncontrolled parties
have in similar economic functions.
C. Comparable Profit Method
This third method is applied if the MTM and the CAT cannot be
used to determine a proper arm's length price. Under this method, the
"reported operating income"'42 is compared to the comparable profit
interval to establish an acceptable transfer price. If the reported oper-
ating income falls within the CPI, the transfer price will generally be
considered to be at arm's length.43 If it does not, an adjustment may
be made by the IRS to bring it to the "most appropriate point within
the [CPI]." This is determined by considering all the facts and cir-
cumstances in the case.45
D. Comparable Profit Interval Method
The CPI method is used to compute an arm's length transfer price
when the MTM does not apply. It is therefore used in applying the
CAT or the CPM. The CPI determines whether the profit earned by
the taxpayer is within a certain profit range of similar firms perform-
ing similar tasks. The regulations set out six steps in determining a
comparable profit interval:46
1. Select the party to a controlled transaction to be tested.
The selected party does not have to be the one that is
inder audit. An example given in the 1992 Proposed
Regulations posits that the CPI of a foreign subsidiary
may be selected even if the U.S. parent is the entity under
review. 47 The tested party will be the one with the most
accurate data and the "most accurately quantifiable
data. ' 48 Furthermore, the regulations state that the trans-
feree will ordinarily be the tested party when reviewing
the transfer of intangibles.49
42. Reported operating income is defined as the operating income reported on a timely
filed (or amended) U.S. income tax return before an audit by the IRS has commenced. Id.
§ 1.482-2(d)(5)(v).
43. Id § 1.482-2(d)(5)(ii).
44. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(5)(iii).
45. Id. § 1.482-2(0(8).
46. Id § 1.482-2(f).
47. Id. § 1.482-2(f)(4).
48. Id § 1.482-2(f)(4)(ii).
49. Id
[Vol. 10
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2. Determine the applicable business classification of the
tested party. There are two steps to determine the appli-
cable business classification: (1) Identify the operations of
the tested party with respect to the intercompany transac-
tions; and (2) Match the tested operations to uncontrolled
entities that have similar operations. 50 Tested operations
are defined as operations that are "related to or integrated
with the transactions with controlled parties that are under
review."5 1 This is based on the products, functions and
services performed.
3. Compute constructive operating incomes. "Constructive
operating income is derived by applying profit level in-
dicators computed from uncontrolled taxpayers to finan-
cial data of the tested party."52  The uncontrolled
taxpayers should be similar to the taxpayer under review.
Some similarities that should be considered are the size of
the business and the relative markets served.
Profit level indicators are also selected to compute
the constructive operating profits. The profit level indica-
tors can be any of the following: rate of return on assets,
margins (operating income/sales, gross income/operating
expenses, operating income/labor costs, operating income/
expenses-cost of goods sold), and comparable profit splits
(residual profit split5 3 and overall profit split54).55
4. Determine the comparable profit interval. The determina-
tion under this step requires that the constructive operat-
ing incomes of the comparable uncontrolled taxpayers be
50. Id. § 1.482-2(f)(5)(i).
51. Id. § 1.482-2(d)(5)(ii).
52. Id. § 1.482-2(f(6)(i).
53. Under the residual profit split, income attributable to assets is determined by
applying a rate of return to the value of assets held by the uncontrolled taxpayers.
This amount then is subtracted from the operating income of each such uncon-
trolled taxpayer to yield the residual income. The sum of the uncontrolled taxpay-
ers' residual incomes is the residual combined income. The profit split is the
percentage of the residual combined income earned by each uncontrolled tax-
payer. This profit split is then applied to the tested party to calculate its construc-
tive operating income. The same rates of return that were applied to the
uncontrolled taxpayers are applied to the assets of the group of controlled taxpay-
ers and the resulting amount then is subtracted from the combined operating in-
come of the group of controlled taxpayers. The residual combined income then is
apportioned among the group of controlled taxpayers in the same percentages that
were determined for the uncontrolled taxpayers.
Id. § l.482-2(f)(6)(iii)(C)(3)(ii)(A).
54. "Under the overall profit split, the group of controlled taxpayers' profit split is deter-
mined in the same manner as under the residual profit split, but without first providing a return
on assets." Id. § 1.482-2(1)(6)(iii)(C)(3)(ii)(B).
55. Id. § 1.482-2(f)(6)(iii)(C).
1994] 205
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constricted so that any extreme divergences are eliminated
in computing the comparable profit interval.56
5. Determine the most appropriate point in the comparable
profit interval. The most appropriate point in the interval
is the cluster of similar firms that are included in the com-
putation of the interval.5 7
6. Determine the transfer price for the controlled transac-
tion. The final step is calculating the transfer price. This
price should generate an operating income that equals the
constructive operating income at the most appropriate
point in the interval.58 If the constructive operating in-
come falls within the interval, the IRS will not make any
adjustment; if it does not, then the transfer price will be
adjusted so that it falls within the interval.
E. Qualified Cost Sharing Arrangements
A qualified cost sharing arrangement59 is defined as an arrange-
ment involving two or more participants60 that provides for the shar-
ing of the costs (including direct and indirect costs61) and risks of
developing an intangible in return for a specific interest in the pro-
duced intangible.62
The cost sharing arrangement must include an identification of
the participants, the duration, the intangible development area(s) cov-
ered, the method for dividing costs of developing intangibles, the ex-
tent to which any tangible or intangible property not developed under
the arrangement is made available to participants, the extent to which
non-participants are allowed to use the intangible, the nature of any
exclusive rights, any conditions under which the arrangement can be
modified or terminated, and the general administrative provisions of
the arrangement. 63 The purpose of these provisions is to set out con-
56. Id. § 1.482-2(f)(7).
57. Id. § 1.482-2(0(8).
58. Id. § 1.482-2(0(9).
59. Id. § 1-482-2(g)(2)(i)(A)-(E).
60. U.S. participants are defined as "any eligible participant of a cost sharing arrangement
whose income or earnings may be relevant for U.S. federal income tax purposes. Thus, for
example, a 'U.S. participant' includes a controlled foreign corporation as defined in [I.R.C. §
957." Id. § 1.482-2(g)(7)(iii).
61. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(7)(ii).
62. The requirements for cost sharing arrangements are set out as follows: "(A) The mate-
rial provisions of the arrangement are recorded in writing contemporaneously with the formation
of the cost sharing arrangement; and (B) Any change to a material provision of the arrangement
is recorded in writing and is reported [on the income tax return, Form 5471 or Form 5472 filed
by participant]." Id. § 1.482-2(g)(6)(i).
63. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(6)(iii).
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tractually the method by which the benefits and burdens are to be
shared between the contracting parties.
The costs and risks of development must be reasonably allocated
between the participants in the cost sharing agreement. There is a
presumption of unreasonableness if the taxpayer's cost/income ratio'
is "grossly disproportionate"'6 to that of others in the participating
group. However, the taxpayer can rebut this presumption by proving
that the approach used is reasonable.66 If this ratio is found to be
disproportionate, the IRS will deem a transfer of the intangible67 be-
yond that contemplated by the arrangement. This transfer will be sub-
ject to the buy-in and buy-out provisions68 to determine the arm's
length price.69 Buy-in and buy-out payments can take the form of a
lump sum payment, installment payments, or royalties.7"
The cost/benefit analysis used to determine a cost sharing ar-
rangement can be measured by anticipated units of production (where
there is a uniform unit of production), anticipated sales (measured at
the same level of the production or distribution process for all partici-
pants), anticipated gross or net profit, or any other reasonable mea-
sure.7" Furthermore, adjustments to the cost sharing must be made,
generally on an annual basis, to reflect any changes in economic con-
ditions or business operations of the participants, and for the continu-
ing development of intangibles specified in the arrangement.72
The IRS has the discretion to make allocations on a qualified cost
sharing arrangement if it determines that the arrangement is not broad
64. The cost/income ratio of a U.S. participant is the average of the cost of devel-
oping intangibles borne by the participant divided by the participants average op-
erating income attributable to intangibles developed under the arrangement. The
cost/income ratio of other participants is the sum of the other participants' average
costs divided by the sum of their average operating incomes attributable to the
intangibles developed under the arrangement. [These averages are computed by]
using the average from the current taxable year and the two preceding taxable
years.
Id. § I.482-2(g)(2)(ii)(C)(2). Different periods may be used for averaging purposes if they
would more clearly reflect the costs and income. Id.
65. "A U.S. participant's cost/income ratio not will be considered substantially dispropor-
tionate if it is less than twice the cost/income ratio of the other eligible participants." Id.
§ 1.482-2(g)(4)(ii)(D).
66. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(2)(ii)(C)(1).
67. "The portion of the intangible deemed to have been transferred will be measured by the
difference between the U.S. participant's cost/income ratio and the cost/income ratio of the other
eligible participants." Id. § 1.482-2(g)(4)(ii)(C).
68. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(4)(iv)..
69. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(4)(ii)(C).
70. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(4)(iv)(B).
71. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(2)(ii).
72. Id. § 1.482-2(g)(2)(ii)(B).
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enough to cover related intangible development73 or that the develop-
ment of the products or services will not be used in the active conduct
of a trade or business.74
VI. Tim TEMPORARY § 482 REGULATIONS
The 1993 Temporary Regulations are a significant change from
the 1992 Proposed Regulations. The 1992 Proposed Regulations were
released in proposed form, which means they were not effective until
released as temporary and then finalized. The purpose of the 1992
Proposed Regulations was to solicit taxpayer responses and sugges-
tions in the intercompany transfer pricing area.
The 1993 Temporary Regulations replace the 1992 Proposed
Regulations.75 The 1993 Temporary Regulations became effective 90
days after they were published in the Federal Register76 and supersede
the previous regulations (1968 Regulations). If the 1993 Temporary
Regulations are finalized within three years, they will permanently re-
place the 1968 Regulations.77 However, the 1968 Regulations will
become effective again if the 1993 Temporary Regulations are not
finalized within the three year time period.7"
A. Important Changes Form the 1992 Proposed Regulations
to the 1993 Temporary Regulations
Several changes were made in the 1993 Temporary Regulations
as a result of taxpayer commentary to the 1992 Proposed Regulations.
Some of the important changes were the priority of methods, profit
splits, periodic adjustment with respect to the transfer of intangibles,
and the availability of a de minimis exception.
The priority of methods in the 1992 Proposed Regulations em-
phasized that the matching transaction method (MTM) was the highest
method to be applied followed by the comparable adjustable transac-
tion method (CAT) and the comparable profit method (CPM). The
73. Id § 1.482(g)(4)(i)(A). "For this purpose, consideration will be given to the partici-
pant's prior business practices, the business practices of uncontrolled taxpayers in the same or
related businesses, and the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification code which includes
such products or services" Id. § 1A82(g)(4)(i)(B).
74. Id § 1.482-2(g)(4)(i)(C).
75. Sonic sections of the 1992 Proposed Regulations were re-released as proposed regula-
tions at the same time as the 1993 Temporary Regulations. 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (1993). For an
analysis of the new proposed regulations, see part VII below.
76. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1993). The 1993 Temporary Regulations were published
on January 21, 1993 and are effective for taxable years beginning after April 21, 1993.
77. 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (1993)
78. Id.
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1993 Temporary Regulations introduces the "best method" rule.79
This rule focuses on a "facts and circumstances" test, depending on
the accuracy of the data used and how closely the controlled and un-
controlled transactions are comparable.8 0
The profit split approach in the 1992 Proposed Regulations was
perceived as difficult to implement. These sections were re-released
in proposed form in January 1993 and are available only for certain
transactions."'
Periodic adjustments are required under both the 1992 Proposed
Regulations and the 1993 Temporary Regulations. The 1992 Pro-
posed Regulations required that the taxpayer review its intercompany
transactions annually and make an adjustment if the new price did not
fall within the comparable price interval (CPI).82 The approach in the
1993 Temporary Regulations states that the annual adjustment must be
commensurate with income, which is not necessarily the same as the
CPI.
The 1993 Temporary Regulations include a de minimis exception
that was not contained in the 1992 Proposed Regulations. This excep-
tion applies to companies that have less than $10 million in aggregated
sales revenue.8 3 Election for this exception is made by filing a state-
ment attached to the taxpayers U.S. income tax return.84
B. "Best Method" Rule
These new regulations are a substantial improvement in several
respects. For example, they include new concepts such as the "best
method" rule.8" This "best method" rule supersedes the hierarchy of
pricing methods in the proposed regulations. It came about as a result
of the numerous comments, like those by the American Electronics
Association, that taxpayers submitted which suggested a more flexible
approach to pricing methodologies.86
The "best method" rule of the regulations states that the arm's
length result should be determined by the "most accurate measure of
79. Ua § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A).
80. Ud.
81. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (1993). See part VII below.
82. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(0, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992).
83. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-IT(f)(1)(ii) (1993).
84. Id. § 1.482-1T(f)(1)(iv).
85. Id. § 1.482-1T(b)(2)(ii)(A).
86. Electronics Group Comments On Transfer Pricing Regs, Tax Analysts, 92 TNT 227-
44:, October 22, 1992. The AEA is an influential group of electronics companies with over 2,700
member companies in industries such as computer, semiconductor, telecommunications, defense
and software, hia
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an arm's length result under the facts and circumstances of the trans-
action." 7 Factors that determine the best method are: the complete-
ness and accuracy of the data used, the degree of comparability
between controlled and uncontrolled transactions, and the number,
magnitude, and accuracy of the adjustments required to apply each
method. 8
From the taxpayers' standpoint, an important factor to focus on is
the comparability issue. This is because finding comparable uncon-
trolled transactions will still be difficult for producers of unique
goods, such as companies in the high technology field.
C. Comparability
The new regulations include comparability factors which are
used in comparing controlled transactions to uncontrolled transac-
tions.8 9 The factors are: functional analysis, analysis of risk, contrac-
tual terms, economic conditions, and property and services. 90 There
are also provisions for market share considerations and location sav-
ings.91 Each factor is discussed below.
The functional analysis is based on finding comparable transac-
tions between entities that have similar functions. The functions con-
sidered are: "research and development; product design and
engineering; manufacturing or process engineering; product
fabrication, extraction and assembly; purchasing and materials man-
agement; marketing and distribution functions...; transportation and
warehousing; and managerial, legal, accounting and finance, credit
and collection, training, and personnel management services." 92
The risk factor93 is discussed at length in the 1993 Temporary
Regulations, although it was not mentioned in the 1992 Proposed Reg-
ulations. This analysis focuses on the risk assumed in relation to the
transaction, by comparing the risk assumed by a controlled taxpayer to
the risk assumed by an uncontrolled taxpayer. Some of the risk fac-
tors considered are: "market risks including the fluctuations in cost,
demand, pricing, and inventory levels; risks associated with the suc-
cess or failure of research and development activities; financial risks
including fluctuations in foreign currency rates of exchange and inter-
87. Temp. Treas. Reg. § I.482-1T(b)(2)(iii)(A)
88. Id.
89. Id § 1.482-1T(c)(1)(i).
90. Id § 1.482-T()(3)(i)-(v).
91. Id § 1.482-IT()(4)(i)-(ii).
92. Id. § 1.482-1T(c)(3)(i).
93. Id § 1.482-1T(c)(3)(ii).
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est rates; credit and collection risks; product liability risks; and general
business risks.'""4
The controlled taxpayer must also have contractual terms that are
comparable to those of an uncontrolled taxpayer.95 This is an impor-
tant feature to consider because it affects the way businesses analyze
their intercompany agreements. Intercompany agreements determine
the allocation of income and expenses between related parties. Com-
panies should review their agreements to assess any potential alloca-
tion problems that could arise as a result of an IRS audit.
Economic conditions must also be factored into the comparability
evaluation. 96 Some of the economic conditions are: realistically avail-
able alternatives to the buyer and seller, the similarity of geographic
markets, the relative size of each market and the extent of economic
development, the level of the market, the market shares for the items
transferred or provided, location of specific costs, and competition in
the market.97
The 1993 Temporary Regulations also include provisions for
market share factors and locations savings. 98 These regulations state
that the savings achieved from being in an economical locality may be
shifted to an entity not in that locality to compensate for the competi-
tive factors. 99 This comparability standard is less stringent than the
standard imposed by the Proposed Regulations because transactions
do not need to be exactly comparable, but rather need only to be "suf-
ficiently similar."" As discussed, adjustments may be made to the
transactions to compensate for inherent differences between controlled
and uncontrolled transactions.
In sum, the comparability analysis focuses on an analysis of the
facts and circumstances of each case. This is a more flexible approach
than suggested in the Proposed Regulations.
D. "Arm's Length" Standard
According to the regulations, the "arm's length" standard is to be
followed in a controlled transaction. 10 1 The purpose of the "arm's
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1A82-1T(c)(3)(iii).
96. Id. § 1-482-1T(c)(3)(iv).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1A82-1T(c)(4)(i)-(ii).
99. Id. § IA82-1T(c)(4)(i).
100. Id. § 1.482-1T(c)(2)(i).
101. Id. § 1.482-1T(b)(1). "The 'arm's length result' of a controlled transaction is the
amount of consideration that would have been charged or paid (or the profits that would have
been earned) in comparable transactions between uncontrolled taxpayers." Id.
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length" standard is to place controlled taxpayers on a "tax parity" with
uncontrolled taxpayers through the assessment of the controlled tax-
payers "true taxable income.""0 2
The regulations also introduce the new concept of an "arm's
length range." 103 This is similar to the comparable profit interval pro-
visions in the 1992 Proposed Regulations. As long as the taxpayer's
income falls within this "arm's length range," the IRS will not make
adjustments.1 4 However, if the income is outside of the range, the
IRS can make adjustments that "ordinarily will be to the midpoint of
the range.""1 5
This new "arm's length range" is an important concept for tax-
payers to consider when reviewing comparable transactions because
these transactions will be determinative of the range.
E. Pricing Methods for Transfers of Properly
The 1993 Temporary Regulations discuss three methods of pric-
ing property transfers: (1) the comparable uncontrolled transaction
method (CUT), (2) the comparable profits method (CPM), and (3)
other methods. 106
1. Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method
The CUT is similar to methods contained in the 1992 Proposed
Regulations. As a result of taxpayer comments, the 1993 Temporary
Regulations have combined the MTM and the CAT into the CUT.
This new method is not tested under the CPI as was required under the
1992 Proposed Regulations. 107 In conjunction with the "best method"
rule, the CUT should generally be the most accurate arm's length re-
sult. 0 ' Therefore, CUT can be used to establish the arm's length
range.
Under the CUT, the form of compensation for the transaction
must be similar to that found in a comparable uncontrolled transac-
tion."° Moreover, intangible transfers can be evaluated on an annual
basis to determine whether the intangible price meets with the "com-
102. Id. § 1.482-lT(a)(1).
103. Id § 1.482-1T(d)(2)(i).
104. Id. § 1.482-1T(d)(2)(i)(A).
105. Id. § 1.482-1T(d)(2)(i)(C).
106. Id. § 1.482-4T(a). A fourth method, using profit split, is discussed in proposed regula-
tions issued with the 1993 Temp Regs. See part VII(A) below.
107. Id § 1.482-4T(c)(1).
108. Id
109. Id § 1.482-4T(e)(1).
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mensurate with income" standard."' If conditions have changed such
that the pricing of the intangible no longer reflects an arm's length
result, an adjustment must be made."' This annual adjustment is cer-
tain to be heavily criticized by taxpayers as an undue burden.
2. Comparable Profits Method
The CPM in the 1993 Temporary Regulations is substantially
similar to the CPM discussed in the 1992 Proposed Regulations." 2
One notable difference is that the CPM is no longer a required test of
the other comparable pricing methods. 1 3 However, relative profit
levels between controlled transactions and uncontrolled transactions
will be considered as part of the comparability analysis." 4
The CPM will generally be applicable for transactions "unless the
[taxpayer] uses valuable, non-routine"' intangibles that itself (1) ac-
quired from uncontrolled taxpayers... or (2) developed itself.""' 6 In
addition, the CPM will be applied on an "industry segment" basis and
only after adjustments have been made under: the I.R.C. § 482
regulations. 17
The arm's length result considered under the CPM is determined
by using a single profit level indicator rather than several indicators as
indicated in the 1992 Proposed Regulations. The profit level indica-
tors used under this method are (1) return on capital employed, (2)
ratio of operating profit to sales, and (3) ratio of gross profit to operat-
ing expenses."" The Regulations also allow other reasonable meas-
ures to be used.119
VII. NEw PROPOSED REGULATIONS
A. Profit Split Method
In conjunction with the 1993 Temporary Regulations issued on
January 13, 1993, a new set of Proposed Regulations were issued re-
garding profit split methods. 20 The new proposed methods include:
(1) residual allocation rule (RA), (2) capital employed allocation rule
110. Id. § 1.482-4T(e)(2)(i).
111. Id
112. Id § 1.482-5T.
113. Id. § 1.482-5T(a).
114. Id.
115. Id. The definition of "non-routine" is absent from the regulations.
116. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T(a) (1993).
117. Id. § 1.482-5T(b)(2).
118. Id. § 1.482-5T(e)(1)-(2).
119. Id § lA82-5T(e)(3).
120. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T, 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (1993).
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(CEA), (3) comparable profit split rule (CPS), and (4) other meth-
ods. 121 The new proposed methods supersede the previously issued
1992 Proposed Regulations on profit split methods.
B. Foreign Legal Restrictions
Proposed regulations covering foreign legal restrictions on pay-
ments between controlled taxpayers were also released.1 1 2 Under
these regulations, the IRS will recognize the restrictions if: (1) the
restrictions are publicly promulgated and apply to similarly situated
taxpayers; (2) the taxpayer has exhausted all effective and practical
remedies for obtaining a waiver of the restrictions; (3) the restrictions
prevent the payment or receipt of the arm's length price; and (4) the
taxpayer has not engaged in any transaction which has the effect of
circumventing the restriction (i.e. distributing a dividend). 12 3
Moreover, the taxpayer must elect the deferred method of ac-
counting as specified in I.R.C. § 461.124 Essentially, this means de-
ductions relating to blocked income can only be claimed in the year
that the income can be included on a U.S. tax return. Companies in
this situation will have an additional burden to track these expenses
separately (blocked expenses vs. non-blocked expenses). This is par-
ticularly applicable to high technology companies that have significant
research and development expenditures. Since these regulations are
still in proposed form, comments will be considered before they are
re-issued as temporary regulations.
VIII. IRS IMPROVEMENTS IN ADMINISTERING § 482 IssuEs
Another I.R.C. § 482 consideration is the implementation by IRS
officials of several methods to improve the administration of I.R.C.
§ 482 cases. The administrative focus is on the following: centraliz-
ing the cases so that there is a standard approach, developing detailed
audit guidelines to assist IRS agents in assessing these cases, and co-
ordinating communication between the IRS counsel's office and the
Examination Division which will assist in litigation of § 482 issues. 125
These issues should be carefully followed. In fact, assistant IRS com-
missioner Frances Homer has stated that these administrative items
121. Id. § 1.482-6T(c)(1).
122. This issue was raised in Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir,
1992), as discussed in the appendix.
123. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-lT(t)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (1993).
124. Id
125. Successful Section 482 Rules Hinge On Better Administration, Officials Say, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) at G-8 (Nov. 10, 1992).
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The U.S. has negotiated numerous tax treaties with foreign coun-
tries to provide relief from double taxation. The "competent authority
rules" permit taxpayers to request the U.S. competent authority to at-
tempt to resolve any issues with the foreign country competent author-
ity. But such a request is exactly that; the competent authority can
refuse the request.
In resolving any transfer pricing issues, the U.S. competent au-
thority" 7 will apply I.R.C. § 482 and the underlying regulations. In
so doing, the competent authority will also consider the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case.128
The IRS is attempting to reduce the time to settle tax issues with
treaty partners by engaging in personal negotiations. Although the
time has been reduced from five years to two since 1991, the IRS
believes it can be further improved. Currently, IRS officials meet with
the Canadian competent authority every quarter and with all other
treaty partners every six months. 12 9
X. CONCLUSION
Previously, companies would wait until an IRS audit before look-
ing at these transfer pricing issues. Under the regulations as now
drafted, companies will be required to take a position with respect to
property transfers on a yearly basis at the time their tax returns are
being prepared. Companies will now have to take a prospective ap-
proach rather than a retrospective approach. Considering the stiff
penalties which could be imposed, this prospective strategy can save
companies significant sums of money.
When addressing intercompany transfer pricing on a prospective
basis, companies should consider the viability of transfer pricing stud-
ies. These studies consist of an in-depth, economic and financial anal-
ysis, and are performed by a variety of consulting firms. These are
126. Id.
127. The U.S. competent authority is the Assistant Commissioner (International) and is re-
sponsible for administering, interpreting and applying these treaties. Rev. Proc. 91-23 § 2.04,
1991-1 C.B. 534
128. Rev. Proc. 91-23 § 3.03.
129. IRS Said Trying To Improve Competent Authority Process, Expand APA Program,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-4 (Nov. 13, 1992).
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generally highly involved exercises and would apply primarily to me-
dium to large multinational corporations.
The complexity and significance of these intercompany transfer
pricing regulations is not to be ignored. The new regulations affect
many facets of technology companies and any implications that they
have should be dealt with prior to an IRS audit. For larger companies,
it may be advisable to seek an APA to reduce the risks of the penalty
provisions. Smaller companies may be able to benefit from the safe
harbor provisions. For companies somewhere in between, it is advisa-
ble to review operations and engage in a transfer pricing study to as-
sess any potential tax exposure.
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APPENDIX: LITIGATION OF § 482 IssuFs
Discussed below are selected cases that have been litigated on
transfer pricing issues. 130 They are illustrative of the court holdings in
this area and the dollar amounts that are at stake.1
3
'
1. Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner
In Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner,132 the IRS attempted to allo-
cate fee income to Westreco because it determined that the fees paid
by Nestec (a Swiss subsidiary of Nestle, S.A.) to Westreco did not
clearly reflect income pursuant to I.R.C. § 482.133 In this instance,
Westreco is a U.S. subsidiary of Nestec which contracted to perform
research and development activities on behalf of Nestec and Nestle.1
34
Westreco was responsible for the development and improvement of
new products and processes. 135 As compensation for performing these
R & D services, Nestec paid Westreco on a cost plus basis. In this
contract, Nestec was to reimburse Westreco for certain expenses
136
plus a 7.5% profit on the first $350,000 of expenses, 5% on the next
$1,500,000 and 3.5% of any additional expenses. 137
The IRS issued a deficiency notice to Westreco in which the IRS
reallocated total fees of $19,515,542 from Nestec to Westreco for the
period from 1978-1982.138 The IRS used a multiplier method to deter-
mine this amount. However, at the trial, the IRS offered no evidence
to support this calculation but rather based its determination on com-
parable business data.' 39 The court held that Westreco proved that the
allocations made by the IRS were defective and that Westreco sus-
130. Currently on appeal is Yamaha Motor v. Commissioner, U.S. T.C. Nos. 2674-88,
23619-88 and 18939-91, motion filed Oct. 21, 1992, objection filed Oct. 27, 1992, order filed
Nov. 2, 1992. The total deficiencies in this case total $183.3 million. Tax Court Places Burden
On IRS To Prove Adjustments In Yamaha U.S.A. Case, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-2 (Nov. 9,
1992).
131. "According to IRS statistics, in the first 11 months of fiscal 1993, the IRS recovered
about 17 cents on the dollar in cases with over $10 million at issue. Of the 87 cases settled
without trial, it got 12 cents on the dollar. At the same time, of the 30,263 cases settled with
under $10 million at issue, the IRS got about 42 cents on the dollar." George Guttman, News
Analysis: IRS averages: Winning Little, Losing Big, 93 Tax Notes Int'l (Tax Analysts) at 197-2
(Oct. 13, 1993).
132. Westreco Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1992-561, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 849 (1992).
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id. at 2-3.
135. Id. at 18.
136. kI. at 26. Includable expenses were: all salaries, rent, consulting fees, raw materials,
equipment, and administrative expenses, but not taxes. Approximately 50-60% of Westreco's
expenses were salary. Id.
137. Westreco, T.C. Memo 1992-561, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) at 18.
138. Id. at 30.
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tained the burden of proof with respect to the reasonableness of their
approach.140 This signalled yet another defeat for the IRS in a transfer
pricing case.
2. Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner
The Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner141 appellate decision af-
firmed the holding of the Tax Court that found the allocation of in-
come to Procter & Gamble from its wholly owned subsidiary was
inappropriate. In this case, Procter & Gamble A.G. (AG), a Swiss
corporation, entered into a License and Services Agreement with its
U.S. parent, Procter & Gamble (P&G).142 The agreement provided
that AG would pay royalties to P&G "for the nonexclusive use by AG
and its subsidiaries of P&G's patents, trademarks, tradenames, knowl-
edge, research and assistance in manufacturing, general administra-
tion, finance, buying, marketing and distribution."1 43
AG organized a subsidiary in Spain, P&G Espana S.A. (Espana),
with the understanding that under Spanish law it was a crime to make
payments from Spanish entities to foreign countries without express
government approval. 1" This restriction was lifted in 1985 when
Spain joined the European Economic Community. As a result, Espana
began to pay royalties to AG.145
The IRS determined that two percent of Espana's net sales should
be allocated as royalty payments to AG for 1978 and 1979.146 This
resulted in an increase of AG's income by $1,232,653 in 1978 and
$1,795,005 in 1979.147 The Tax Court held that this redetermination
of income was improper because the royalty payments were restricted
under Spanish law and not by P&G.1 48
Because of a lack of conflict among the circuits, the IRS has cho-
sen not to seek review by the Supreme Court.1 49 Interestingly, the
140. Id. at 30-31.
141. Procter & Gamble v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 1256.
143. Id
144. "The Spanish government approved P&G's application for 100 percent ownership in
Espana by a letter dated January 27, 1968. The letter expressly stated that Espana could not,
however, pay any amounts for royalties or technical assistance." Id. at 1257.
145. Id
146. Procter & Gamble, 961 F.2d at 1257. The years in question were before the payment
ban was lifted.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1258.
149. IRS Won't Petition High Court on Foreign Issue in 'Procter & Gamble', Source Says,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-1 (Nov. 9, 1992).
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concerns in this case have been factored into the drafting of the 1993
Temporary Regulations and is discussed in part VII, above.
3. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner
In Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner,150 which was filed after the
Procter & Gamble decision, the petitioners argued that the holding in
Procter & Gamble should apply in the situation where Saudi Arabia
restricted the price on crude oil. The court ruled that Exxon's profits
could not be reallocated under I.R.C. § 482 or § 61 (gross income). 151
The tax deficiencies sought by the I.R.S. in this case were in excess of
$6 billion. 5 '
4. Bausch & Lomb v. Commissioner
In Bausch & Lomb v. Commissioner,'53 the deficiency* assessed
by the IRS reflected the IRS contention that there was a lack of arm's
length pricing between Bausch & Lomb, Inc. (B&L) and Bausch &
Lomb Ireland, Ltd. (B&L Ireland). In January of 1981, B&L and
B&L Ireland entered into a non-exclusive license agreement to manu-
facture lenses.15 4 The IRS reallocated income from B&L Ireland to
B&L by applying I.R.C. § 482 principles.' 55 The reassessment for
1981 was an additional $2,359,331 and $18,425,750 for 1982.156 The
Tax Court found these amounts unreasonable and reduced the amounts
to $1,255,331 for 1981 and $4,173,000 for 1982.111 The appellate de-
cision affirmed the Tax Court holding.'5 8
150. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1992-92, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2067 (1992)
151. T.C. Memo 1993-616, 1993 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 629, 66 T.C.M. 1707.
152. Id.
153. Bausch & Lomb v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
154. ld. at 1087.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1086.
157. Id.
158. Bausch & Lomb, 933 F.2d at 1086.

